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I. Overview 
The EU’s role in the international legal order has increased rapidly in terms of conduct, competence, 
action and practice. It comprises a dynamic and static set of elements (i.e. conduct etc.)- and a complex 
intersection between them. Yet methodologically there are arguably many ways to examine EU action 
in the world . The so-called 'Brussels-effect' or Global Reach of EU law is one of the most famous ways 
of understanding EU action in the world. It has been charted in literature over several decades and 
was distinctively developed often by US and Swiss-based authors as much as from EU-based authors/ 
scholars across a range of disciplines, rendering it a rich field of global thought.11 The essence of the 
phenomenon of the global reach of EU law is that the laws, rules and standards governing the single 
market constitute homogenous forms of regulation for a vast range of subject areas governing a bloc 
of half a billion consumers and traders are sufficiently desirable that many third countries adopt them 
as takers. Alternatively, traders, businesses, companies, associations, and countries receive them or 
are subjected to them, compelled to or otherwise. However, it is largely a story told without reference 
to international institutions because it is a story of EU interactions indirectly or passively through 
acceptance and receipt of EU law by countries, markets, traders and associations. Key scholars remain 
ambiguous about, for example, whether the WTO constrains or facilitate the so-called 'Brussels 
Effect'.2  It demonstrates the need to examine carefully and holistically the nature of the EU’s 
interactions with the global legal order when we reflect on the place of international organisations or 
institutions therein.  It poses the question as to how to understand EU interactions with international 
organisations as a question of effect in law and how holistic an approach should be. It demonstrates 
further the direction of focus as a methodological challenge worth exploring.  
This chapter explores the form of EU interactions with international institutions in law as 
multidirectional: inwards, outwards and the in-between. It is a case study of the normative, empirical 
and descriptive in an effort to engage in holistic reflections. This chapter seeks to invoke to a highly 
expansive view of a ‘legal effect’ of the EU in the international legal order to justify the reflection upon 
an array of actions, practice and activities, of intersecting internal and external facets of EU law and 
policy.3 This chapter also seeks to reflect upon a broad notion of ‘legal effects’ in order to consider the 
EU’s international law-making and practice holistically, normatively, empirically and descriptively, as 
                                                          
1 See A. Bradford ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) Northwestern University Law Review 1; J. Scott, ‘The New EU Extraterritoriality’ (2014) Common 
Market Law Review 1434. 
 
2 See A. Bradford ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) Northwestern University Law Review 1; D. Sinopoli, ‘WTO law, EU Extraterritoriality and the 
Brussels Effect’ (Unpublished PhD manuscript, 2018). 
3 E. Fahey, ‘European Citizens Initiative STOP TTIP Can Proceed Says General Court’ (2017) 8 European Journal of Risk Regulation 787-790. 
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broadly as possible and perhaps wider than the conventional view of EU international relations- or at 
wider than conventional legal views thereof. It does so by focussing on the EU’s interactions with 
international organisations usually omitted in studies of EU interactions with international 
organisations. It thus adopts a novel approach to the study of EU interactions with international 
organisations.  
This chapter takes a broad perspective on the concept of framing interactions between organisations 
in a holistic sense- ‘inwards out’, ‘outwards in’ and the ‘in between’. The chapter examines the idea 
of an ‘effect’ in internal law-making and  external law-making practice. It argues that the concept of a 
legal effect needs to be broadly understood and deliberated upon. The chapter examines the inter-
relationship between an internal and external effect of interactions with international organisations 
on the part of the EU. What are the reasons for differences in understanding effects? How is and 
should a legal effect be understood? Is norm promotion so fundamental or essential? Is an 
institutionalised understanding of legal effects factually and normatively justified? What is a viable 
methodology? This chapter aims to frame the term ‘effects’ as broadly as possible so as to understand 
actual practice, soft practice, political practice and give a holistic account of law-making. A holistic 
account reaches for both internal and external elements of an effect. EU law-making practice in its 
internal laws and external relations components are rarely linked as a spectrum for joined-up analysis.  
 
This chapter does this as follows. Firstly, it explores how one means by which the EU interacts with 
other international institutions is through participation and design with an ‘effect’ which is 
‘outwards’:- how the EU engages in the global legal order, as a normative proposition. Thus, one 
means by which the EU engages in participation and design in the form of interaction with other 
organisations and institutions is through institutionalisation, i.e. the creation of new international 
institutions, depicted here as a form of external engagement, outwards. Secondly, the EU engages 
‘inwards’ with other international institutions through incorporating their norms in its law-making, 
e.g. by referencing them in its law. This takes place even if it is not a member of that organisation nor 
is technically required to incorporate those norms. This genre of participation is more internalised and 
‘inwards’ in its operation and is more of an empirical study. Thirdly, there is descriptively a story of 
contestation taking place, which is ‘in between’:-, which is more of a descriptive state of affairs, rather 
than normative or empirical by design and explores tentatively challenges at national and EU level.   
The first example will be shown to be an ‘outwards’ example of active participation whilst the second 
will be shown to be an ‘inwards’ example of interaction. The link between the two is explored in the 
form of reflection upon the EU’s participation in international organisations arising in a dispute 
between the Member States and the EU institutions in litigation before the Court of Justice. The idea 
of the ‘in-between’ effects thereof provides a means to explore the interaction between the two, 
‘globally versus internally.’ It is significant as a form of dynamic conflict or struggle between 
constituencies of the EU multi-layered legal order. It is also significant because it tries to present a 
novel and holistic view of EU action in the world and enable deeper inter-disciplinary engagement on 
the EU in the world. It further compliments chapters to the book discussing interaction and effects as 
one-dimensional ideas, flowing from the EU’s interactions with international organisations in a 
unidirectional or one-way sense only. The case studies considered, thus inwards, outwards and in-
between, are reflected upon by way of contrast. They are argued to be diverse yet to also highlight 
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the multifaceted components of EU action in the world through law. They highlight the need to link 
the normative, empirical and descriptive contours of legal effects and to engage more robustly with 
law. It is argued thus that the multidirectional nature of effects is important methodologically to 
reflect upon and gives a more accurate picture of the complexities of the EU as a global actor- 
composite, esoteric and incomplete. It is arguably studied in greater detail in political science rather 
than legal literature although less so with respect to the nuances of law and legal effects.4  
The use of sources and approaches both ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’, plots interactions of the EU in 
the world within law-making statically and dynamically. The chapter adopts a ‘law in context’ approach 
in European Union law, to take into account the multi-disciplinarity of EU law, its highly diverse 
instruments and processes.5 It addresses the law-making process directly by focussing upon active 
convergence of sources as to how they arise. It also looks at the descriptive components more 
carefully through analysis and reflection thereof.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. It examines the ‘outwards’ and ‘inwards’ effects- and their mutual 
interaction. Section I considers the ‘outwards’ effects of EU interactions with international 
organisations, focussing upon institutions and institutionalisation. Section II considers the concept of 
‘inwards’ effects of participation in international organisations in internal law-making, examining how 
we understand external norms in EU law and the EU’s place therein. Section III reflects upon the 
relationship between ‘inwards’ and ‘outwards’ effects, focussing upon litigation in EU law as to 
participation in international institutions and organisations, followed by Conclusions reflecting on the 
need for an interdisciplinary, multi-faceted and holistic view of EU action in the world, particularly 
where it relates to law.  
II. Outwards- the normative story 
(i) EU Institutionalisation in the global legal order 
One way of viewing the EU’s commitment to the external multilateral legal order is through its explicit 
commitment to institutions and developing these institutions in the global legal order through 
processes of institutionalisation.6 The EU is committed in its Treaties to being an internationalist and 
to pursuing multilateral solutions, pursuant to the well-known provisions of Article 21(3) TEU.  
Institutionalisation here is understood as the processes of formalisation and stabilisation of 
procedures, institutional coordination and the ability of individual actors to influence institutional 
development, through and by institutions. 7 There is arguably firm evidence that the EU has shown 
itself to want to have ‘outwards effects’ in the international legal order not limited to mere 
participation therein but also to include its active design and its participation therein.8 This further 
indiciates that the EU view of outside effects is exceptionally broad.  
                                                          
4 E.g. see the chapter of Jorgensen in this volume.  
5 See Rob van Gestel, and Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship’ (2014) 20 ELJ, 292, 313-6 (‘An Agenda for 
a European Debate’); Tamara Hervey and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011); Rob van 
Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz and Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Methodology in the New Legal World,’ EUI Law Working Paper 2012/ 13; Ulla 
Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen and Lynn Roseberry (eds), European Legal Method (DJOF 2011); cf ‘The New History of EU Law’ project, University 
of Copenhagen available at <http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk/>  
6 See the Introductory chapter to this Volume by Wessel and Odermatt. 
7 E. Fahey, Institutionalisation beyond the Nation State: Transatlantic Relations, Data, Privacy and Trade Law (Springer Law, 2018) 
8 Fahey, ibid, Ch. 1, et seq. 
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In an era where major parts of the world wish to leave, threaten to leave or even defund international 
organisations (African Union from the International Criminal Court (ICC), UK from the Council of 
Europe and European Union, US from World Trade Organisation (WTO) or United Nations (UN)), we 
may now even be entering some form of grand era of wholesale ‘de-institutionalisation’, albeit such a 
claim is difficult to prove or evaluate at this moment in time. The EU by contrast has a long history of 
supporting the development of new international organisations through institutionalisation. For 
example, in the European context, the EU has a recent history of promoting and ‘nudging’ institutional 
multilateral innovations, from the International Criminal Court,9 a UN Ombudsman10 to a Multilateral 
Investment Court11 in its efforts to promote internationalisation, accountability, legitimacy and the 
rule of law as a broad global agenda. The EU was also recently an active participant in the so-called 
‘mega-regionals’, where EU-US transatlantic relations would have been subsumed within a broader 
geopolitical shift outside of the WTO, through ‘new’ forms of institutional arrangements.12 
Additionally, the EU has acted as a ‘cheerleader’ for the development of several key international 
organisations as part of its multilateral agenda, even if not a member e.g. International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), World Health Organisation or World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). 
13This external agenda of institutionalisation has had tangible effects upon the EU in the world, where 
it seeks to join more international institutions and make its external coherence and presence more 
palpable in law. Many of these institutions in recent times have been developed very prominently 
with the help of civil society or through innovative transparency and deliberation practices e.g. as to 
the Multilateral Investment Court.14 Much controversy may attach to this agenda but it is still of much 
significance as evidence of the EU pushing for institutionalisation in a period of deinstitutionalisation 
through multilateralism and ‘active global-ness’.  
 
(ii) Institutionalisation and the EU’S Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy:  a limited future? 
The history of the EU’s institutionalisation efforts in the global legal order is not necessarily articulated 
with precision in the Treaties or in law and policy.15 One good example of this much is the EU’s new 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. The Strategy and EU’s broader 
agenda is about supporting public international law. This is because it is an agenda which links clearly 
to the socialisation of the external norms international organisations into its internal laws, discussed 
next. 
                                                          
9 See: International Criminal Court. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
10 See: UN Ombudsman. See UNSC Resolution 2083 (2012). Kokott, Juliane ; Sobotta, Christoph, ‘The Kadi Case - Constitutional Core 
Values and International Law - Finding the Balance?’ European Journal of International Law 2012 p.1015-1024. 
11 See: Multilateral Investment Court. See Council of the European Union, ‘Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral 
court for the settlement of investment disputes’ 12981/17. 
12 Billy Melo Araujo, ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: Deep Integration in Mega-Regional and Plurilateral Trade Agreements and the Role of 
the WTO’ UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. 21, 2, p. 101-153 ; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional 
Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law’ (2015) 8 Global Trust Working Paper Series 1; Sophie Meunier and Jean-Frederic Morin, 
‘No Agreement Is an Island: Negotiating TTIP in a Dense Regime Complex’ in Mario Teló and Tereza Novotná (eds) The Politics of Transatlantic 
Trade Negotiations: TTIP in a Globalized World (Ashgate 2015). 
13 See C. Kaddous (eds.) The European Union in International Organisations and Global Governance: 
Recent Developments (Hart, 2015). 
14 Commission, ‘Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and Beyond: The Path for Reform’ available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF> accessed 30 April 2018. 
15 See G. De Burca,’Contested or competitive multilateralism? A reply to Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane’ (2016) 5(3) Global 
Constitutionalism, 320. 
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The EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy is the most explicit invocation of the term 
‘global’ in the EU’s policy making to date and warrants analysis as to the future of the EU’s multilateral 
agenda.16 The growing prominence of foreign policy is evident within EU law from the new Strategy, 
which is 60 pages long and reflects the enhanced foreign affairs competences of the EU post-Lisbon, 
multiples of its predecessors in length.17 The place of institutions and institutionalisation there is 
worthy of remark. The central thesis of the Strategy is that the EU will promote a ‘rules-based’ global 
order with multilateralism as its key principle and with the United Nations at its core.18 Guided by the 
values on which the EU was founded, the Strategy proclaims that the EU is committed to a global order 
based on international law. As a result, it has a different goal than the Solana Strategy, then concerned 
to establish the EU as a global player in security in particular, now being about its concrete realisation, 
internally and externally, and bilaterally and multilaterally. While the EU is ‘incontrovertibly a soft 
power’, it has to demonstrate its hard power capabilities.19 The Strategy has two features of 
significance from a legal perspective in assessing the global dimension of EU law: inter-connectedness 
of internal and external policies and flexibility.20 The specificity of the Strategy as to its commitment 
to a rules-based legal order and institutionalisation processes must be seen as distinctive, i.e. 
institutions where the EU enjoys a privileged position, United Nations, World Trade Organisation and 
International Criminal Court. It thus gives prominence to the institutions where the EU enjoys a 
privileged position.  
                                                          
16 It follows on from Vice President Mogherini being asked in December 2013, a decade after the adoption of the Solana Strategy to assess 
the global environment and report to the Council in 2015. Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016.  
17 The EU’s Global Strategy remarks that ‘we live in a world of predictable unpredictability’ p. 46, as a specific reference to the planned 
plebiscite of Brexit and its impact upon the geopolitical landscape of the world. See S. Blockmans, Brexit, Globalization and the Future of the 
EU (Intereconomics 2016) 4; G. Grevi, ‘A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union’ [2016] European Policy Centre 1; N. Tocci, 
‘Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (2016) 51(3) The International 
Spectator 1; W. Wagner and R. Anholt, ‘Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s New Leitmotif: Pragmatic, Problematic or Promising?’ (2016) 
37(3) Contemporary Security Policy 414; J. Garcia, ‘Resilience as the new EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatist Turn?’ [2016] European 
Security 1. 
18 E.g. see 3.5. 
19 'Editorial comments: “We perfectly know what to work for”: The EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy' (2016) 53 Common 
Market Law Review, Issue 5, pp. 1199–1207,1203. 
20 ‘Shared Vision, Common action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (European 
Union Global Strategy, 28 June 2016), available at <https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf> accessed 30 April 2018. 
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The challenge remains as to how the EU will pursue further or deeper institutionalisation through 
setting up new organisations even in the era of greater hostility to international organisations, e.g. its 
development of an Multilateral Investment Court. It does not seem that this is an ambition of the 
Strategy, where no new institutions are planned. The current global apathy to internationalisation 
may indeed explain this. Nevertheless, the EU still pursues other multilateral agendas e.g. the Paris 
Accord. It is thus not necessarily obvious from the Strategy how the EU should more generally pursue 
institutionalisation beyond the State. Similarly, how Brexit will impact upon the EU’s hard-fought place 
in international organisations remains to be seen. Nonetheless, this should not detract from the place 
of institutionalisation as a distinctive feature of how the EU engages globally and how it may pursue 
institutions in other domains outside of the Strategy. Overall, it is clear the outwards dimension of the 
EU in the world appears concrete and realisable and there are many examples of its operation in the 
form of the creation of new international organisations, as a legal effect. To date, clearly there have 
been important legal effects of the EU’s efforts at institutionalisation, where the outside effects show 
the EU designing the global legal order through institutions.  
(II) Inwards- the Empirical Story 
(i) Place of external norms of international institutions in EU law 
While the EU is under an obligation to respect international law in its Treaties pursuant to Article 3(5) 
TEU, EU law is not particularly explicit about the relationship between international law and EU law 
and leaves much of the question of incorporation and effects for further development.21 Much legal 
scholarship has traditionally approached this in a court centric way, studying the place of public 
international law within EU law. It is only recently that legal scholars have sought to take a broader 
multidisciplinary take on the relationship between law-making and courts.22 EU legislation in the field 
of Justice and Home affairs drew inspiration for some time from Council of Europe Conventions.23 
Nowadays the European Union wants to lead as an organisation in the international context.24 It thus 
forms a very different climate for the use of external norms. AFSJ is a useful field of study as a dynamic 
policy field with internal and external facets as a study of inwards effects of public international law.25 
External norms are deployed in most of the 18 AFSJ Directives of the last legislative cycle of the EU, 
from 2009-2014, broadly interpreted as diverse instruments of public international law. In 18 
Directives of the Stockholm Programme legislative cycle external norms also played a role in 15 
Directives where they are invoked to justify, explain and support new rule-making.  It is a clear study 
of the rising inwards effects of public international law. The AFSJ is a good example of a field with 
                                                          
21 Article 3(5) TEU: ‘The EU shall uphold and promote… the strict observance and the development of international law’; T. Konstadindes, 
‘Customary International Law as a Source of EU Law: A Two-Way Fertilisation Route’? [2016] Yearbook of European Law 1; R.A. Wessel and 
S. Blockmans, The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union, in P. 
Eeckhout, M. Lopez-Escudero (Eds.), The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 223-248; R.A. Wessel 
and S. Blockmans (Eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of International Organisations, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer, 2013. 
22 J. Wouters, J. Odermatt, T. Ramopoulos, ‘Worlds Apart? Comparing the Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature 
to International Law’ in M. Cremona & A. Thies (eds.) The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges 
(Hart 2014), 249-279.  
23 See V. Mitseligas, ‘The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice?’ (2009) 34 E.L.R. 523, 525. 
24 In line with Article 21 TFEU: see Communication to the Commission from the President in Agreement with Vice-President Ashton: Strategy 
for the progressive improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, COM (2012) 9420 final.  
25 E. Fahey ‘Joining the dots: external norms, AFSJ directives & the EU’s role in the global legal order’, (2016) 41 European Law Review 105. 
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significant external influences in law-making and important links to international organisations arising 
from those external influences warranting exploration.  
It is thus instructive to zoom in upon such law-making. For example, the external norms in instruments 
‘promoted’ in the 19 Directives of the AFSJ include two specific ‘internal’ norms and the remainder 
are analysed here as ‘external’ norms: thus the Convention on Mutual Assistance in criminal matters 
between the Member States of the European Union is an European Union specific instruments and 
are thus classifiable as an ‘internal’ instrument.26 The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) may arguably be classified similarly also because 
the EU has incporated it into its Charter, even if it has not acceded to it and ECHR caselaw regularly 
features in the preambles of many new AFSJ directives.27 Alternatively, it may be viewed the closest 
external norm of the EU to its own legal order. As amended by the Lisbon Treaty, art. 6(2) TEU provides 
that the European Union “shall accede” to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Despite 
the CJEU  decision in Opinion 2/13, however, its place as part of the general principles of EU law for 
some time and its relationship to the Charter of Fundamental Rights suggest that it is a de facto 
internal norm.28 
 
‘External’ norms found in AFSJ Directives mostly have a much broader membership than EU Member 
states in all but two instances.29 These norms include the European Social Charter of 1961,30 General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATT),31 Economic Partnership Agreement with the Cariforum 
countries of 2008,32 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,33 First Optional Protocol on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,34 Second Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography,35 Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications procedure,36  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,37 
                                                          
2628 parties, all European Union Member States (MS):  Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty 
on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union 2000/C 
197/01. 
27 The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) (ECHR) available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm. > accessed 30 April 2018. 28 European Union Member States (MS).  
28 See Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, confirming its place as an external norm. 
29 I.e. the Economic Partnership Agreement with the Cariforum countries and Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications procedure: see below further in the following footnotes for references. 
30 47 parties and 28 European Union MS are parties to the European Social Charter, available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp> accessed 30 April 2018  
31 159 members, all 28 European Union MS members, European Union a member and all members of the WTO are signatories to the GATS 
1869 UNTS 183; 33 ILM 1167 (1994) available at <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm> accessed 30 April 2018 
32 43 parties, 27 European Union MS except Croatia, and European Union are members of the Economic Partnership Agreement available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?redirect=true&treatyId=7407> 
accessed 30 April 2018. 
33194 Parties, all European Union MS are Parties to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Convention on the Rights of a Child 
(adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 1577, p. 3. available at: 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&article=4&lang=en> accessed 30 April 2018 
34155 Parties, all European Union MS are Parties: Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict  (adopted 25 May 
2000, entered into force 12 February 2002) UNGA A/RES/54/263 UNTS, vol. 2173, p.222, available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&article=4&lang=en> accessed 30 April 2018 
35 167 parties, all European Union MS are Parties: Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 
(adopted on 25 May 2000, entered into force 18 January 2002) UNGA A/RES/54/263 UNTS vol. 2171, p. 227 available at < 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&article=4&lang=en > accessed 30 April 2018 
36 6 European Union MS are parties: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure (adopted 
19 December 2011, entered into force 14 April 2014) UNGA A/RES/66/138 available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-11-d&article=4&lang=en. > accessed 30 April 2018. 
37 174 parties, all European Union MS are parties, European Union has signed and ratified: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) UNGA A/RES/61/106 UNTS vol. 2515, p. 3 available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=iv-15&article=4&lang=en.> accessed 30 April 2018. 
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UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,38 ILO Convention concerning 
forced or compulsory labour,39 Convention relating to the status of refugees (Geneva Convention),40 
Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse,41 the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women,42 the 
Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention,43 the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, 44 the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime45 and the Council of Europe Convention on 
laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime and on the financing of 
terrorism.46 The Economic Partnership Agreement with the Cariforum countries and Third Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure are the external 
norms used which have the smallest membership and demonstrate preference for the use of broadly 
accepted norms. More detailed examination of the use of the Conventions in AFSJ law is set out 
elsewhere.47 The vast majority of external norms in AFSJ directives involve all Member States as 
parties. Contrariwise, the European Union is not a party itself to most of the instruments used, 
arguably because they are multilateral treaties. A small number of the agreements, treaties or 
conventions used by the European Union in AFSJ Directives have not been ratified by all of the 
Member States themselves.48   The vast majority form instruments where the EU is not a party but 
where most but not necessarily all the Member States are, mostly for procedural reasons not allowing 
the EU to be a party thereto or for other pragmatic reasons, such as where all the States are already 
members. 
This trend demonstrates the widespread socialisation of the EU despite technical challenges to its 
fuller membership. Their broad incidence also indicates a highly active socialisation process, even in a 
controversial field and an intention to uphold international law. It forms a useful example of the 
widespread impact of international organisations upon EU law through the UN. Unlike studies looking 
at the citation and use of public international law in EU law and generally focussing upon the CJEU, 
                                                          
38 159 parties, 27 European Union MS are parties, except Czech Republic, European Community has signed and ratified it: Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (adopted on 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 November 2003) UNGA A/RES/55/25 UNTS vol. 2237, 
p. 319 available at < https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&lang=en > accessed 30 
April 2018. 
39 177 parties, all European Union MS are Parties:.  Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour No.29 (entered into force 1 May 
1932) UNTS vol. 39, p. 55 available at < 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174> accessed 30 April 2018. 
40 145 Parties, all European Union MS are Parties: UNGA Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into 
force 22 April 1954), UNTS, vol. 189, p. 137.   Available at < https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en> accessed 30 April 2018.   
41  . 31 parties, 18 European Union MS are Parties: Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation 
and Sexual AbuseCETS No. 201 available 
at<http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=201&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG.> accessed 30 April 2018 
42 188 Parties, all European Union MS are Parties: UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 
18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UNTS vol. 1249, p. 13 available at < 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&article=4&lang=en.> accessed 2017.  
43 66 parties, 28 European Union MS: Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime CETS No. 185 available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> accessed 30 April 2018. 
44 73 parties, 23 European Union MS are parties: UNGA  Vienna Convention on Road Traffic (adopted 8 November 1963) available at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/conventn/CP_Vienna_convention.pdf.> accessed 30 April 2018. Its membership is broader 
that the Geneva Convention on Road Traffic of 1949 (96 parties, 22 MS).  
45, A/RES/55/25. 188 parties, European Union is a signatory, 26 MS are Parties: UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) UNGA A/RES/55/25, UNTS vol. 2225, p. 209  available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xviii-12&chapter=18&lang=en > accessed 30 April 2018. 
46. 28 European Union MS are parties; European Union is a signatory: Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism CETS No. 198 available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=198&CM=8&DF=11/10/2013&CL=ENG > accessed 30 April 2018. 
47 Fahey *** 
48 E.g. the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic.  
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when we consider the influence of external norms from a particular dimension or interaction as 'effect' 
we see the broad influence of external norms not limited to the EU itself or one specific court. It 
provides strong evidence of socialisation through and by external norms even in a highly complex and 
sensitive legal domain as strong empirical inwards reception of external norms in the AFSJ. It is a very 
specific field with much openness to external norms in the AFSJ. It is a very specific field with much 
openness to external norms.   It is thus not easily viewed a widespread but still is an important trend 
in the EU’s most sensitive field.  
 
The next section explores the dynamic between the inside out and the outside-in. It considers what 
alternative means are possible to view this phenomenon. It seeks to look beyond the EU as an 
‘internal’ perspective and examines the broader ‘external’ or ‘international organisation-centric’ 
perspective. The account next turns to the final element of EU interaction with the global legal order 
reflected on here, the ‘in-between’ dimension. It is the descriptive element of interaction, where 
factual contestation of EU interaction and 'effect' is challenged and at issue and thus a useful way to 
‘round off’ the analysis.  
 
III. The ‘In-Between’ - the Descriptive Story 
Contestation as to the participation of the EU in international organisations  
There are important issues surrounding the dynamic of ‘inwards’ and ‘outwards’ effects that are worth 
exploring. This chapter thus next reflects upon the relationship between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
effects of EU interaction with the global legal order and how the inter-relationship may arise in the ‘in 
between’ space.  It is useful to recall that the EU has had a very limited formal impact in the global 
legal order with respect its membership of international organisations in the post-Lisbon period, and 
arguably limited enough formal ‘effects’.49 The barriers that the EU faces in developing its status in 
international organisations have many internal and external dimensions, both within the EU itself and 
the targeted organisation.50 They do not necessary always arise with the same level of particularity or 
direct salience. It is a factual and rather descriptive state of affairs which is outlined here and thus 
differs from the normative and empirical reflections above. 
There has been very little case law within EU law itself on the interaction of the Member States and 
the EU in international organisations where the EU is not a member. Until recently, Article 218(9) TFEU 
was understood to apply to the procedures surrounding the negotiating of international agreement 
and the suspension of the aforesaid and more specifically, the positions adopted on the EU’s behalf in 
bodies established by an agreement.51 Beyond this, the duty of cooperation generally governs 
unilateral action of the Member States.  Existing salient case law on international organisations that 
the EU is not part of, while numerically small, is perhaps all the more esoteric because it concerns 
principally the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a specialist UN agency in maritime affairs 
which does not allow an international organisation to join and of which all EU Member States are 
                                                          
49 See Henri de Waele and Jan Jap Kuijper (eds), The Emergence of the European Union’s International Identity – Views from the Global Arena 
(Brill 2013).  
50 Ibid.  
51 Inge Govaere, ‘Novel Issues Pertaining to EU Member States Membership of other International Organisations: the OIV case’ in Inge 
Govaere and others (eds), The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013), 225; 
E. Fahey, The Global Reach of EU Law (Routledge, 2016), Ch. 2. 
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members.52 This case law mostly has as its common denominator a ratio as to the duty of sincere 
cooperation on Member States with respect to the acquis. However, recent case law has stretched 
the limits of Article 218(9) TFEU.53 Membership is a useful touchstone of the ‘in between’ because it 
targets centrally the issue itself. The decision of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in Germany v. Council 
(OIV) grants considerable powers to the EU to ‘develop’ itself in international organisations and act so 
as to protect its acquis where the EU has no formal status and not all Member States are members- 
yet where EU law still prevails.54 It is argued to constitute a distinctive example of the tension between 
outwards and inwards action through EU law. The case is distinctive as a useful example of interaction 
of inwards and outwards dimensions of the definition of effects.  
Germany v. Council concerned resolutions that had been adopted on behalf of the EU in the 
International Association for Vine and Wine (OIV), an intergovernmental organisation with 
competences in the areas of vines, wines and related products, and the provisions of Article 218(9) 
TFEU as to the adoption of a position for the Union.55 The EU was not yet a member, nor were all of 
the Member States and the EU had not acquired any special status in the OIV. The Council had not yet 
given the Commission authorisation to negotiate accession to the OIV. Secondary law had previously 
introduced references to OIV resolutions and it raised the question of their ‘internal’ effects as 
‘external norms’. It thus raises the question of the sensitivity of the CJEU to ‘effects’ of external norms. 
Moreover, previous resolutions adopted by the OIV were not classified as relevant to the EU’s acquis.  
For over a year after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Commission proposals for a Union 
position in the OIV were rejected by the Member States. The Member States in 2011 adopted 
resolutions by consensus, which were deemed to affect the EU’s acquis, and under pressure of 
infringement proceedings, a proposal was adopted with four Member States voting against it and one 
abstaining. A Council decision was then  adopted by qualified majority on the basis of Article 43 TFEU 
as to the common agricultural policy, in conjunction with Article 218(9) TFEU, for the resolutions to 
be passed and certain Member States voted against it, including Germany. Germany sought the 
annulment of the decision on the basis that the latter was not the appropriate legal basis and argued 
that it could not be used where the EU was not a member to the organisation. It also argued that the 
article presupposed a binding act, with legal effects, which according to Germany, was not the case 
for an OIV resolution. The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice found that the wording of Article 
218(9) TFEU was not limited to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements.56 The resolution 
decisively influenced EU law because it related to the common organisation of wine markets, which 
fell under the Common Agricultural Policy. As a result, the EU was entitled to establish a position in 
light of their direct impact on the EU’s acquis and the OIV decision had legal effect in EU law. The only 
case cited in the entire decision of the Grand Chamber decision is Commission v. Greece.57 However, 
as the duty of sincere cooperation does not feature in its reasoning, it renders it less convincing to 
support this construction of the application of Article 218 TFEU. The technical and even procedural 
nature of the decision should not emasculate its result, which puts significant obligations upon 
                                                          
52 See <http://www.imo.org/en/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 30 April 2018. Case C-308/06 Intertanko EU:C:2008:312 57 [2008] ECR I-4057. 
See also the ILO Convention to similar effect.  
Case C-188/07 Commune de Mesquer v Total France EU:C:2008:359 [2008] ECR I-4501. 
Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:81 [2009] ECR I-701. 
53 See also Opinion 1/13 (Child Abduction) EU:C:2014:2303 [2014] ECR I-000.  
54  C-399/12 Germany v Council EU:C:2014:2258 [2014] ECR I-000. 
55 <http://www.oivint/oiv/info/enmembresobservateurs?lang=en> accessed 30 April 2018. By 2014, there were 21 EU Member States and 
46 Member States, marginally more than at the time of the litigation  
56 Para 54. 
57 Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:81 [2009] ECR I-701. 
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Member States, not limited to or even based on the duty of cooperation.58 The decision amounts to a 
very questionable extension of EU competence through the procedural terms of Article 218 TFEU.59  
Germany v Council (OIV) is arguably an important example of ‘weak’ judicial review of external action 
giving rise to EU ‘global reach’ because the decision appears to give the EU considerable powers in a 
broad array of international organisations where the EU is not yet a member. It reflects the fluidity of 
the construct of competence and the difficult place of court-led jurisdiction in external relations. 
Similarly, the case is far from a perfect example of external competence intersecting with practice. Yet 
it should remind us of the challenging contours of the ‘in-between’ and the difficultly of changing the 
status quo.  
The case has received modest scholarly critique and limited inter-institutional critique. Its esoteric 
nature could not be more apparent. And yet such weak judicial review of the ‘in between’  appears to 
do little for the social legitimacy of the EU as an evolving entity in the global legal order.  There are 
few incentives in EU international relations for a broader diversity of litigants arguably to challenge 
the in-between. Member States alone are incentivised to litigate yet may not wish to do so for various 
reasons. It could bring into sharp focus the distinction between blocs of countries, large versus small 
states or other constellations.60 The juridification of the ‘in between’ is not the only way yet there are 
very few cases to litigate its contours and so it is a very limited and arbitrary snapshot. Still, it provides 
a very real case study of change in action. For espace reasons this specific examins has been focussed 
upon. However, going forward, there are a range of possible examples likely to emerge. For example, 
it may be the case that the new era of preferential trade agreements post-Lisbon comprising a broad 
range of regulatory cooperation bodies generates further case law on the parameters of delegations 
of authority in other parts of Article 218 TFEU.61 This may generate perhaps a different range of 
litigation and a broader range of litigant as to aspects of EU and Member State participation in 
transnational entities. It may be through court-centric methods that the in-between becomes more 
apparent and real.  
Conclusions  
 
The three elements explored here, outwards, inwards and the in-between, focused upon the 
normative, empirical and descriptive content of EU action in the world, through the broadest 
understanding of a legal effect. A legal effect is, as this account demonstrates, multifaceted. As has 
been shown here, the outwards dimension of EU action in the world is well exhibited through the EU’s 
institutionalisation attempts. The EU’s Strategy does not necessarily give a flavour of the form of 
activities but is clear that the EU’s multilateral agenda is a cornerstone for its State-like behaviour in 
the world. The effects are thus powerful and realisable where the EU achieves concrete outcomes. 
The inwards dimension thereof suggest a similarly vibrant and dynamic effort to socialise the EU in 
the global legal order and incorporate its norms. The effects are more complex and not so realisable 
                                                          
58 See Govaere, who describes this omission as ‘illogical’: above, 238. 
59 Ibid, 225-243.  
60 The EP rarely litigates international relations, even now with considerably more powers to defend : E. Fahey ‘Between One-Shotters and 
Repeat Hitters: A Retrospective on the role of the European Parliament in the EU-US PNR Litigation’ in Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies (eds.) 
EU Law Stories (CUP, 2017). 
61 See W. Weiss, ‘Delegation to Treaty Bodies in EU Agreements: Constitutional Constraints and Proposals for Strengthening the European 
Parliament a’European Constitutional Law Review (forthcoming). 
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directly or immediately but still are indicative of practice. The ‘in-between’ is more nuanced but 
suggests significant fundamental conflict on the notion of effects, contestable and challengeable at 
Member State level. The case studies considered by way of contrast are diverse yet highlight the 
multifaceted components of EU action in the world through law. They highlight the need to link the 
normative, empirical and descriptive and to engage more robustly with law and its multi-faceted role. 
It is an important methodological point to reflect on, as to how to engage with the multidirectional 
nature of EU interactions with international organisations, which this account has sought to wade into, 
and requiring doubtless further development. 
 As the Introduction to this book also explains, the EU’s action on the global stage is not fully accepted 
or understood as of yet. The case studies developed in this chapter overall aim to draw together an 
idea of what is meant by a holistic understand of EU interactions with international organisations. It is 
of significance that such casestudies draw attention to a bigger picture, beyond the classical ‘Global 
Reach of EU law’ storytale. It draws attention to the place of international organisations in 
understanding the global reach of EU law in its many nuances. As a contribution, it aims to provoke a 
future research agenda on the gap between legal, political science, international relations and political 
economy in particular of EU action in the world, which is dynamic and ongoing and in need of further 
reflection. Even amongst such approaches, substantive differences exist as to the place of law-making 
and courts therein. Still, there are gaps even within this form of holistic methodology e.g. as to the 
place of the CJEU, which underscore the need to reflect upon a holistic future agenda.  
